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Sinn	Fein	and	the	prospect	of	a	hard	Brexit:	time	to
drop	Abstentionism
Sinn	Fein’s	presence	in	the	Commons	would	help	focus	the	government’s	mind	on	the	consequences	of	a	hard
Brexit	for	Northern	Ireland,	writes	Sean	Swan.	The	very	real	prospect	of	a	hard	border	means	the	time	has	come	for
Sinn	Fein	to	decide	whether	it	is	playing	the	game	of	politics	or	not.
The	achievement	of	peace	in	Northern	Ireland	cannot	be	understood	simply	in	terms	of	the	signing	of	the	1998	Good
Friday	Agreement.	Peace	was	not	an	event:	it	was	a	process.	That	process	was	long	and	complex,	but	certain
events	were	central	to	it.	One	such	event	was	a	speech	given	in	November	1990	by	Peter	Brooke,	then	Northern
Ireland	secretary,	stating	that:
The	British	government	has	no	selfish	strategic	or	economic	interest	in	Northern	Ireland:	our	role	is	to
help,	enable	and	encourage.	Britain’s	purpose	[…]	is	not	to	occupy,	oppress	or	exploit,	but	to	ensure
democratic	debate	and	free	democratic	choice.
An	advance	copy	of	this	speech	had	secretly	been	supplied	to	the	leadership	of	the	IRA.	The	intent	was	to
demonstrate	that	London	was	neutral	between	nationalists	and	unionists	in	Northern	Ireland.	London’s	position	now
was	that	the	constitutional	position	of	Northern	Ireland	was	a	matter	solely	for	the	people	of	Northern	Ireland.	The
aim	was	to	convince	the	republican	movement	that	London	could	be	trusted	to	act	as	an	honest	broker:	“It	is	not	the
aspiration	to	a	sovereign,	united	Ireland	against	which	we	set	our	face,	but	its	violent	expression.”
Brooke’s	speech	laid	the	foundation	for	the	Downing	Street	Declaration	on	15	December,	1993,	in	which	the	Prime
Minister,	John	Major,	and	the	Taoiseach,	Albert	Reynolds,	agreed	that	the	constitutional	position	of	Northern	Ireland
was	for	its	people	to	decide.	Major	also	reiterated	that	the	British	government:
have	no	selfish	strategic	or	economic	interest	in	Northern	Ireland.	Their	primary	interest	is	to	see	peace,
stability	and	reconciliation	established	by	agreement	among	all	the	people	who	inhabit	the	island,	and
they	will	work	together	with	the	Irish	Government	to	achieve	such	an	agreement,	which	will	embrace	the
totality	of	relationships
It	was	also	noted	that	the	newly	created	European	Union	would	“require	new	approaches	to	serve	interests	common
to	both	parts	of	the	island	of	Ireland,	and	to	Ireland	and	the	United	Kingdom	as	partners	in	the	European	Union.”
The	Declaration	paved	the	way	for	an	IRA	ceasefire	which	was	announced	on	31	August,	1994.	The	republican
movement’s	understanding	was	that	the	ceasefire	would	lead	to	Sinn	Fein’s	inclusion	in	peace	talks.	However,
internal	British	politics	were	to	complicate	matters.	The	1992	general	election	had	given	the	Tories	a	slim	ten	seat
majority.	This	majority	was	rendered	even	less	secure	by	the	constant	threat	of	rebellion	from	Eurosceptic	‘bastards’
within	the	ranks	of	the	parliamentary	Conservative	party	itself.
It	was	a	minority	government	in	all	but	name.	By	the	end	of	1995	the	Tory	majority	had	eroded	to	only	two.	The	prime
minister,	John	Major,	was	increasingly	dependent	on	the	support	of	nine	Ulster	Unionist	(UUP)	MPs	to	stay	in	power.
But	keeping	the	Unionists	on	side	came	at	the	cost	of	taking,	or	at	the	very	least	being	perceived	to	take,	the
Unionists’	side	in	relation	to	the	peace	process.	The	IRA	ceasefire	continued,	but	the	peace	talks	Sinn	Fein	had
assumed	would	follow	never	took	place.	Instead	there	were	new	demands	for	decommissioning	of	IRA	arms	and	of
the	need	for	a	‘decontamination’	period	before	talks	could	take	place.
Finally,	with	no	progress	having	been	made	towards	peace	talks	and	growing	unease	about	the	entire	process	within
the	IRA,	the	IRA	ended	its	ceasefire	on	9	February	1996.	Their	statement	announcing	the	fact	noted	that	“Time	and
again,	over	the	last	18	months,	selfish	party	political	and	sectional	interests	in	the	London	parliament	have	been
placed	before	the	rights	of	the	people	of	Ireland”.	This	marked	the	start	of	a	new	IRA	campaign	which	avoided
violence	in	Northern	Ireland	in	favour	of	a	bombing	campaign	in	England.
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The	Labour	government	elected	on	1	May	1997	had	a	secure	majority	and	was	thus	free	to	act	impartially	on
Northern	Ireland.	However,	the	IRA	did	not	immediately	restore	its	ceasefire	following	this	election.	The	leadership
needed	to	reassure	its	volunteers	that	it,	not	events	in	London,	would	decide	when	a	new	ceasefire	would	be	called.
This	was	achieved	by	the	symbolism	of	not	ending	its	new	campaign	until	it	had	lasted	exactly	as	long	as	had	the
first	ceasefire	–	526	days.
Once	the	IRA	restored	its	ceasefire	on	20	July,	1997,	the	peace	process	proceeded	relatively	smoothly,	culminating
in	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	the	following	Easter.	The	heart	of	the	Agreement	was	the	principle	of	consent	–
Northern	Ireland’s	constitutional	position	would	be	determined	by	the	people	of	Northern	Ireland;	parity	of	esteem	–
the	right	of	people	in	Northern	Ireland	to	identify	as	British,	Irish	or	both,	and	hold	Irish	and/or	British	passports;	and
the	‘three	strands’	–	relationships	within	Northern	Ireland,	between	North	and	South,	and	between	Ireland	and	Great
Britain.	Unlike	the	Downing	Street	Declaration,	the	EU	was	barely	mentioned	in	the	Agreement	as	it	was	then
assumed	to	be	a	permanent	backdrop	to	Anglo-Irish	relations.	Peace	was	also	implicitly	premised	on	the	border
becoming	invisible	and	largely	irrelevant.
Credit:	Public	Domain.
The	entire	substance	of	the	peace	agreement	is	now	being	washed	away.	Speaking	in	Belfast	on	20	July	2018,
Theresa	May	stated	that	the	British	government	“will	never	be	neutral	in	our	support	for	the	union”	–	a	total	negation
of	the	Downing	Street	declaration.	The	‘backstop’	supposedly	agreed	to	avoid	a	hard	post-Brexit	border	was	dumped
on	16	July	by	an	amendment	to	the	Taxation	(Cross-border	Trade)	Bill.	The	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	–	the	heart	of
‘strand	one’	of	the	Agreement	–	has	been	moribund	since	January	2017;	the	North-South	Ministerial	Council	–	the
heart	of	‘strand	two’	–	has	not	met	since	November	2016.
The	fact	that	the	Conservatives	are	dependent	on	Ulster	Unionist	votes	to	stay	in	power	–	this	time	the	DUP	–	is
hardly	coincidental	to	this	state	of	affairs,	nor	is	the	fact	that	the	Tories	themselves	are	deeply	divided.	It	is	a	re-run	of
the	Major	years.	That	experience	may	be	why,	following	the	2017	general	election,	Major	warned	the	Tories	of	the
dangers	of	a	deal	with	the	DUP.	Describing	the	current	peace	as	“fragile”	Major	pointed	out	that	a	“fundamental	part
of	that	peace	process	is	that	the	UK	government	needs	to	be	impartial	between	all	the	competing	interests	in
Northern	Ireland”.
The	situation	in	Northern	Ireland	itself	has	become	increasingly	fraught.	Derry	has	witnessed	serious	violence	in
recent	weeks,	orchestrated	by	Dissident	republicans	whose	growing	audacity	can	be	judged	by	their	recent	attack	on
the	home	of	former	Sinn	Fein	president	Gerry	Adams.	The	peace	process	was	premised	on	creating	a	political	route
forward,	but	politics	cannot	exist	in	a	vacuum.	And	a	vacuum	is	now	where	Sinn	Fein	finds	itself.	It	has	succeeded	in
becoming	the	majority	nationalist	party	in	Northern	Ireland,	but	absent	a	functional	Northern	Ireland	Assembly,
coupled	with	Sinn	Fein’s	continuing	adherence	to	an	Abstentionist	policy	in	relation	to	Westminster,	there	is	no
political	forum.
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It	is	this	political	vacuum	and	the	real	possibility	of	a	hard	Brexit	and	a	hard	border,	which	is	proving	fertile	ground	for
Dissident	republicans.	The	risks	of	dropping	Abstentionism	–	not	least	of	providing	a	propaganda	coup	for	Dissidents
–	are	well	known	but	are	now	not	as	serious	as	the	risks	posed	by	the	current	situation.	In	fact,	to	the	extent	that
Abstentionism	is	rendering	politics	futile,	it	helps	make	the	Dissidents’	case	that	politics	is	pointless	and	the	only
solution	is	‘armed	struggle’.
Had	the	Sinn	Fein	MPs	been	present	in	the	House	of	Commons	on	16	July,	they	could	possibly	have	brought	the
government	down	and	an	ensuing	general	election	might	have	returned	a	government	opposed	to	a	hard	Brexit.	In
any	case,	Sinn	Fein’s	presence	in	the	Commons	would	help	focus	the	government’s	mind	on	the	full	realities	of
Northern	Ireland.	Hard	Brexiteers	would	not	be	happy	to	be	denied	their	Brexit	by	Sinn	Fein,	but	Northern	Ireland	is
either	fully	part	of	the	UK,	warts	and	all,	or	it	isn’t	–	and	if	it	is,	its	MPs,	all	of	them,	are	fully	entitled	to	vote	on	any
matter	before	the	House.
Finally,	Sinn	Fein	needs	to	remember	that	the	2017	general	election	was	a	crisis	election.	The	nationalist	community
in	Northern	Ireland	returned	seven	Sinn	Fein	MPs,	the	party’s	best	ever	result.	If,	because	of	Abstentionism,	Sinn
Fein	cannot	prevent	a	hard	Brexit	and	ensuing	hard	border,	that	community	will	not	be	blind	to	the	fact	that	had	they
returned	seven	SDLP	MPs	–	or	even	seven	Alliance	MPs	–		a	hard	Brexit	could	have	been	prevented.	And	they	are
likely	to	remember	that	in	future	elections.	Sinn	Fein	is	either	playing	the	game	of	politics	or	it	isn’t;	if	it	is,	it	cannot	do
so	with	one	arm	tied	behind	its	back.	The	time	has	come	to	drop	Abstentionism.
_______
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